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The Rational Islamic Actor? Evidence from Islamic Banking
The rise of Islamic banking creates an interest in its own right as a rising branch in financial intermediation, particularly in the post-crisis era.
1 On the other hand, it also deserves attention from the students of Islamism due to its possible connection with Islamic movements. In addition, economic behavior's suitability for empirical analysis allows us to bring new empirical evidence to the popular but rather speculative debate on the motives of Islamic actors. A better understanding of the preferences of Islamic economic actors, particularly the relative weight of religious and pragmatic interests, helps to gauge the direction that Islamic movements can take in a certain context.
Our study on Islamic banks and their customers reveals important conclusions about
Islamic actors and challenges some dominant assumptions. First, in contrast to popular views that consider Islamic economic actors as financiers of radical Islam, we find that these have pragmatic motivations and they may adapt to liberal systems to seize economic incentives. Our findings contradict exceptionalist assumptions that portray Islamic actors as essentially different, and particularly, more ideological than their counterparts. We find that many Islamic actors pursue self-interest as their non-Islamic counterparts and they are open to reconsider their behavior if the otherwise preferable option becomes too costly. Finally, we argue that this finding has political-economic implications as it may reflect Islamic actors' chances to become part of liberal systems. If "rational" behavior is a prerequiste of liberalism, as suggested by 1 Islamic banks grow with an annual rate of 20% while they have a global asset value of $1 trillion, as of 2011 (IFSI, seminal studies such as Przeworski (1991) 2 , then one can argue that Islamic actors can satisfy this requirement.
The Islamic Finance Movement and its Discontents
Modern Islamic banks were originally formed to solve the fiscal problems of Muslim actors and threby help financing an Islamic society. Because earning interest on cash balances, namely ribha, is considered a major sin in Islamic faith, doing business with conventional banks constitutes a problem for devout Muslims. The inherent structure of Islamic banks, also called "participation banks" in Turkey, are different from conventional banks. Instead of taking deposits and issuing loans that are based on the principle of a pre-determined interest rate, Islamic banks engage in partnerships with their customers, where profits as well as losses are shared with the customers. Net profits generated as a result of lending activities determines the profit shares offered on "participation accounts" which is an analogue to savings accounts in conventional banks. 3 Islamic banks do not extend direct loans to their borrowers either. 4 Financing takes place without issuing direct loans or charging an interest but in the form of a trade agreement. Enabling devout individuals to earn money without interest, these banks argue that they help financing an Islamic society. Further, they suggest that they also contribute to the broader economic environment by bringing new-and otherwise idle-capital into the market.
2 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991) . 3 Participation accounts typically take the form of "mudharaba contracts." In this contract, the bank and the customer engage in a business venture where the customer is the depositor and the bank, the "mudharib" manages the money and shares any profits or losses with the customer. 4 Loans are often issued via "mudharaba" or "murabaha" contracts. In this type of mudharaba, the bank becomes the creditor and the customers is the "mudharib" who is the worker or manager of the business jointly owned with the bank. "Murabaha" is a more popular funding option where the bank purchases a commodity that the customer wishes to purchase. The payment goes to the seller of the commodity. The bank then resells the commodity to its customer for the original price plus a profit margin. The customer pays back his debt in installments. The role of Islamic banking continues to increase in the world financial markets. This development creates curiosity about these institutions, not only among the public but also academic circles from various fields including economics, Islamic law, and political science.
These studies succesully described the functioning of these institutions, the economic and religious needs that they met, or the political-economic context that enabled, or sometimes challenged, their development. Nevertheless, most of these studies focused on the banks as the main units of analysis rather than investigating the preferences and behavior of the individuals who do business with these institutions. Thus, many studies portrayed Islamic banks like a "black box" with inputs and outputs without examining the decision making processes of the participating actors. The motivations and choices of the individuals who shape these institutions or the political implications of these qualities were often missing. Further, in many cases descriptions prevailed over analysis and the lack of empirical evidence prevented scholars from making convincing claims about these economic actors.
Studies on Islamic banks mostly developed in the economics literature and analyzed the economic advantages offered by these banks. They described the functioning of these newly founded institutions and considered if they contributed to the economy. 
Islamic Banks and the Lending Channel
Our goal in this section is to investigate whether there are any quantifiable differences in the 
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In order to investigate the existence of the bank lending channel, we focus on the balance sheet components of Islamic and conventional banks. Specifically, we decompose bank liabilities into those that are subject to reserve requirements (which are essentially demand deposits for conventional banks and current accounts for Islamic banks) and those that are exempt from reserve requirements (which are time deposits for conventional banks and participation accounts for Islamic banks). According to the bank lending channel, a tight monetary policy action that is represented by an interest rate hike leads to a decline in reservable deposits, which in turn reduces bank loans.
A finding that suggests that the customers of Islamic banks remain indifferent to the changes in interest rates (and hence no change in reservable deposits) supports the argument that There is a spillover from the exchange rate to the inflation rate contemporaneously. This assumption is consistent with the inherent structure of the Turkish economy which heavily relies on imported intermediate goods. Going back to the Cholesky ordering, monetary policy affects bank liabilities contemporaneously which feed into bank loans and hence the industrial production.
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All variables but interest rates are in logarithmic form as a precaution against nonstationarity. 41 The data is monthly, expanding from December 2005 through March 2013. We use one lag in the VAR to conserve degrees of freedom in a relatively short sample of 86
observations. This lag specification is also supported by the Schwarz information criterion.
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As we take a look at bank liabilities, there are two sources of bank funding in the model.
The first source is demand deposits for conventional banks and current accounts for participation banks, both of which have negligible returns for the account holders and are subject to reserve requirements. That is, banks need to hold a certain fraction of these deposits as reserves at the central bank. Instead of monetary gains, depositors choose to hold these accounts for their liquidity and convenience such as the ability to make payments without carrying money. The second source of funding is time deposits for conventional banks and participation accounts for participation banks. The primary motivation for holding these accounts is their monetary returns. According to the monetary transmission mechanism, an increase in interest rates increases the opportunity cost of non-interest bearing accounts (such as demand deposits and current accounts) and leads to a decline in such accounts. Meanwhile, accounts with positive 40 The results are robust to alternative plausible Cholesky orderings such as ordering bank loans prior to bank liabilities (assuming that banks issue loans first and then obtain the funding) or placing industrial production index after CPI and prior to the balance sheet variables (assuming that changes in bank loans do not affect industrial production contemporaneously). 41 Non-stationarity is a common challenge in macroeconomic analysis. Nevertheless this is not necessarily a problem so long as the residuals in the VAR are stationary. To address non-stationarity, we take the logarithm of the nonstationary variables. Furthermore, we add one lag of each variable to capture the persistence. The residuals from the VAR analysis are found to be stationary (not shown). This finding supports the validity of our results despite non-stationary regressors. 42 Our results are robust when we incorporate two lags in the VAR. Adding an additional lag allows us to eliminate any remaining correlation in the residual terms. Nevertheless, we prefer to report the results with one lag (as suggested by SIC) which allow more precise estimation due to our limited number of observations. returns (such as time deposits and participation accounts) increase depending on the speed of adjustment of the rate of return on such accounts. increase in interest rate leads to a larger decline in demand deposits relative to current accounts 2) If the customers of participation banks are more sensitive to relative rates of return, an increase in interest rate leads to a larger decline in current accounts relative to demand deposits 3) If the customers of the two types of customers have similar sensitivities rates of return, the decline in demand deposits and current accounts should be comparable.
Meanwhile, the change in time deposits and participation accounts depends on the speed of adjustment of the relative rates of return offered on these accounts in response to a change in interest rates. The fourth and the fifth panels show the response of liquid assets to an interest rate shock for conventional banks (c_liquid_assets) as well as participation banks (p_liquid_assets). We observe that liquid assets follow a U-shaped path following an interest rate shock, which is interpreted as evidence for the existence of the bank lending channel. 44 Bank loans are contractual agreements and cannot be changed immediately in response to a monetary policy action. Indeed, when there is a tight monetary policy action that reduces the liquidity in the banking system, the immediate response of the banking system is to increase their liquidity by selling off their liquid assets. In the long run, however, banks reduce their loan portfolios and bring back their liquid assets to their optimal level. In countries where the financial system is heavily dependent on the banking system such as Turkey, it is natural to expect the U-shape in liquid assets which suggests that the bank lending channel is effective.
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Two panels that are critical for the purposes of this study are the sixth and the seventh panels which trace the responses of demand deposits at conventional banks and current accounts at participation banks to an interest rate shock. Generally, both funding sources exhibit a decline in response to an increase in interest rates consistent with rational depositor behavior. The increase in interest rates leads to an increase in the opportunity cost of holding these accounts, leading the investors to search for alternative instruments for their savings. The declines in the two funding sources are of comparable magnitude although depositors who hold demand deposits seem to adjust somewhat faster than current account holders. Overall, we observe that there is no significant difference in terms of the basic motivations of customers in allocating their savings to low-yield instruments at the two types of banks. Both types of customers consider the changes in relative rates of return in making their optimal allocations.
The eighth and the ninth panels compare the responsiveness of time deposits and participation accounts both of which provide higher yields. If the rates of return in these accounts competitively follow the interest rate change induced by monetary policy, then these accounts may increase following a rate hike. in the first month, participation accounts display a significant decline around the third month suggesting that the profit shares in such accounts cannot be adjusted as fast as interest rate adjustments in time deposits. Figure 3 compares the interest rates offered on 12-month time deposits with the profit shares distributed by participation banks. The top panel reflects that even though average profit share is lower than rates offered on time deposits, the two rates of return follow the same general trend. Indeed, when we test for cointegration between these two series, we find a significant relationship (not shown). These findings are consistent with a free market economy where profit shares are highly correlated with market interest rates. Indeed, for the 2009-2011 interval, the simple correlation coefficient between the two series is 0.87. What is particularly important for our purposes is how the changes in one series is followed by the other one. For example, when there is a change in 12-month interest rates, how long does it take for the profit rates to follow? To answer that question, we construct the cross-correlations between these two series. Table 1 shows the lag and lead correlations between changes in profit shares and changes in 12-month interest rates. Accordingly, the maximum correlation between the two series takes place two months after a change in 12-month interest rates (the correlation coefficient is 0.55). This finding suggests that profit shares tend to change in the same direction as interest rates but likely with a two-month lag or longer. 47 The slower adjustment of profit shares is consistent with the contractual nature of these agreements and explains the decline in participation accounts following an increase in interest rates. The decline in the relative rate of return leads to a decrease in such accounts, which is once again consistent with rational investor behavior.
47 Granger causality analysis (not shown) also indicate that 12-month deposit rates Granger cause profit shares (at one and two-lags) while average profit shares do not Granger cause 12-month deposit rates. The analysis in this section suggests that there is no statistical difference in the customer behavior of the two types of banks in terms of searching for the best rate of return for their savings. 48 The observed differences between the balance sheet components of the two banks mostly reflect the speed of adjustment between the two banks which is due to the structural differences between the operations of the two banks.
Before we conclude this section, it is worth highlighting an interesting aspect of quantitative easing. It is hence plausible to expect a decrease in deposit rates during that time, following the increase in the risk appetite. Nevertheless, while deposit rates sharply bounced back in early 2011, we do not observe a similar increase in profit shares, which widens the spread between the rates of return offered by the two types of banks. There could be several potential explanations consistent with the increase in the spread. An explanation that is consistent with rational economic behavior is related to the perceived riskiness of conventional banks, which increased over the course of the financial crisis as these banks increased their exposure to foreign currency borrowing. This may have led individuals to switch to Islamic banks despite lower returns. Alternatively, it could be the case that the customers of Islamic banks are becoming more religious and hence less rational, willing to accept lower returns. Response of FX to INTEREST RATE I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV   2009  2010  2011 12-month deposit rate Average profit share I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV   2009  2010  2011 12-month deposit rate-Average profit share percent percent
"Interest" Paradox Among Islamic Economic Actors
It is widely assumed that Islamic economic actors' main goal is to avoid un-Islamic, interestbased gains and to finance an Islamic society. 49 Nevertheless, a closer look at these actors' investment and consumer behavior in the previous section suggested that they are not indifferent to pragmatic incentives and show sensitivity to interest rates.
When we shared our findings with Islamic bank managers they typically suggested that those account holders who are sensitive to interest rates and leave Islamic banks during rate hikes constitute the minority of their customer base who choose them not for religious reasons but merely to diversify their interests in the first place. However, devout individuals, their "true" customers, would not shift their accounts elsewhere, regardless of the changes in interest rates. 50 These comments reflect popular assumptions which suggests that Islamic actors are categorically different from their non-Islamic counterparts and behave by pure ideological motives. We disagree with this argument because it is unlikely for the minority of Islamic bank customers to drive the overall rational behavior that we documented in the previous section. The analysis in the following section provides further evidence to defeat these popular assumptions.
While the previous section showed Islamic bank customers' sensitivity to interest rates through macro-level data, the section below demonstrates at micro-level that this sensitivity is also observed among devout customers who prefer Islamic banks for religous reasons. 51 The interviewees were located predominantly in Istanbul. 52 In addition to the above described advantages there are also downsides of snowball sampling, such as the absence of randomness in the sampling process. Figure 4 summarizes the interview results, which suggest that a majority (81.7%) of the customers prefer Islamic banks because of religious sensitivities, that is, to avoid "interest." On the other hand, most interviewees (78%) do not feel economically disadvantaged when they do business with Islamic banks either. This is consistent with our findings in the earlier section where we documented that the profit rates are typically in synch with interest rates so that most of the time customers do not face a dilemma between religious and economic preferences. However, the majority (71%) of the customers who specifically mention that they choose Islamic banks for religious reasons also admitted that they already hold an account in a conventional bank, or at least they had one at some point, for practical reasons such as ATM acessibility or advantageous payment opportunities.
Figure 4. Interest Aversion Among Islamic Bank Customers
Individuals' attitudes towards "installment payments" and "credit card" also offers interesting findings on actors' sensitivity towards the notion of interest payments. In Turkey, many stores offer the option of "installment payments" to their customers in exchange for a higher total price. This creates a dilemma for devout consumers because most Islamic authorities describe this type of payment as another form of interest. In addition, installment payments typically involve credit card use. However, credit cards, even when offered by Islamic banks, raise questions regarding their compatibility with Islamic principles. Islamic banks avoid interest but they charge for "delayed payment" of debt. For some scholars though, this type of a charge is not different from interest rate. Yet, 75 % of our interviewees noted that they chose to make payments through installments, typically using a credit card and even when there is a higher price for the purchase. Despite their religious concerns, actors turn towards this option because of the economic disadvantages of making the entire payment up front and the absence of alternative Islamic payment options.
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In sum, the interviews provide supporting evidence to our findings in the VAR exercise, suggesting that the customers of Islamic banks can be religious and pragmatical at the same time. While they seek to unite both Islamic and economic interests, they may choose one over the other when they fail to fulfill both. Islamic banks are often able to harmonize religious and pragmatic preferences and thereby decrease the pressure on individuals to choose between the two options. Yet, when such dilemmas do ocur, individuals act as rational agents and make their choices by taking the opportunity costs into account.
They stay loyal to Islamic banks when other alternatives are not economically superior.
However, they consider shifting their investments when the other options become significantly more advantageous.
Conclusion
This study observed the behavior of Islamic bank customers and analyzed the impact of religious commitment on their economic decisions. Particularly, we investigated the extent of "interest aversion" among Islamic economic actors, when faced with a dilemma between 53 Due to the large number of "no response" answer to questions on stock and bond holdings we dropped these questions from our analysis.
religious and pragmatic preferences. To this end, we provided a comparison of Islamic and conventional banks around the workings of the bank lending channel.
Our findings suggest that there are no statistically significant differences between the sensitivities or the economic rationalities of the two banks' customers. As our interviews also confirm, devout individuals prefer Islamic banks as long as these provide competitive gains but they may consider alternative investments or economic transactions when they offer superior advantages.
Our analysis allowed an empirical testing of the assumptions on Islamist actors based on "Islamic exceptionalism." Our research based on the case of Turkey demonstrates firstly that Islamic economic actors do not constiute a monolithic entity. Second, just like their counterparts, many Islamic individuals weigh their ideological and pragmatic preferences before they make a choice. They try to follow Islamic principles when these overlap with their pragmatic interests but they are open to reconsider their choices when religious and economic interests diverge. Finally, this adaptive rationality has political-economic implications and suggests that Islamic actors can become part of liberal systems. We believe that this is an important finding that should be investigated further by future studies that can bring additional individual-levelevidence.
Finally, there are two more important questions that deserve further discussion. First, is there a monetary threshold that determine the effectivesness of the above described economic incentives? More specifically, are actors are more likely to respond to incentives above a certain level of opportunity cost? Second, does the income level impact actors' likelihood to respond to economic incentives? In other words, are wealthier people more likely to deviate from their commitment to interest free banking, because stakes are higher?
Or does wealth, at least a certain minimum, make actors more economically satisfied and thus, more indifferent to economic incentives? These issues remained outside of the scope of our analysis and require further research.
